Ballistic logistics

Previous post showed F-35 obsolete

   One of the difficulties with modern military operations is the overloading of infantry, soldiers frequently carry 80 - 100 lbs.  They are carrying enough equipment, food, and ammunition for several days travel plus a major engagement.  One way of simplifying the amount of equipment is to move the logistics onto a modified C-130.  This is useful as long as the opponent does not possess significant anti-aircraft resources.

   Carts, at right, on rails that prevent vertical movement  to prevent them flying around in turbulence would be moved down the length of the aircraft on the left and right sides.  Personal would load logistic containers onto the cart and assemble them.

  The components could be small packages of food, water or ammunition or could be longer packages containing machine guns or spare rifles, A.  Attached to the back would be a radio guidance and maneuver unit with a parachute to slow its descent.  At the front would be an energy absorber which would be compressed by a cable for storage before release.
   The assembled logistics unit would be pushed onto a loading rack, B, after opening the inner hatch.  The inner hatch would be closed and the rack lowered from u to l.  The outer door would be opened and the logistics package released.  If the outer hatch is not fully closed, the inner hatch could not be opened because  the force from the differential pressure of the aircraft being pressurized and teh open hatch causing depressurization in side the launch rack.  This is a safety feature.
   At C, the logistics descend, slowed enough by a parachute  to prevent damage aon landing, assisted by the nose energy absorber.   It would have to descend fast enough for the control surfaces to be effective in guiding it.  The guidance would be by geo-positioning, although a ground hoimng transmitter could also be used.
   The soldiers would carry only what they would need for a 20 minute firefight, until the C-130 arrives.  Even a mortar, in a tadpole shaped case, could be placed on the lowered loading rack and dropped.  In a battle the dropping of logistics would not tell the opponents anything they did not know about the location of the soldiers, since they would be shooting at them, but for a routine food and water drop there is a danger of marking the soldiers' location.  They can see the parachute drop.   Nighttime would reduce the visibility and the risk of marking but not completely eliminate it.
   The control surfaces would have to effective for a drop at at least 10 000 feet altitude and that would determine the minimum rate of fall.  The cost would be fairly enormous; allowing $10 000 per hour operating costs for the aircraft and 8700 hours per year, the cost of one planes one year orbit would be about $100 000 000 ($100 million), but the increase in  tactical flexibility would be immense.
   The system could also drop 250 lb small diameter bombs to assist ground forces.
   This was anoither idea ignored by both DARPA, and the Army.